http://Louis-J-Sheehan.us
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http://www.amazon.com/Struggle-for-Vicksburg/dp/B000EM6XDM/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=dvd&qid=1198168389&sr=1-1
Sir --
Thank you for your very prompt and informative reply. Might I ask for one clarification (I can read whatever response you have in the magazine if you are so inclined)?
With Vicksburg standing, was the Rebel cross-river (shore to shore) transport of goods -- say salt -- and men almost entirely limited to a small corridor in the shadow of Vicksburg itself, and, assuming so, was such cross-river traffic therefore safe from Union interference? If there was one small corridor, then it would seem that cross-river traffic would have been ended simply by occupying the bank of the river across from the city (although such limited effort would not have resulted in the other benefits you mentioned earlier)?
I'll mention I recall you from the old Wargamer and S&T days. I started wargaming in the mid-70. Life has been such that only in the past year have I again been reading about the American Civil War. Knowing some of your past, I'll ask another question/suggest another possible article:
In my own lay-person's terms, with a few notable(AHEM!) exceptions, Jeb Stuart & Co. had the reputation of providing General Lee very good and timely information and for providing good cavalry screens. Could we read an article about how such scouting and screening was organized? That is, graphs showing -- standard? -- patterns of dispersal, amount of cavalry used to satisfy the missions, how one side would react if it thought it might have been discovered/the other side might react if it stumbled across apparent screening/scouting activity? I would ask more questions but I'm not a horse-person and should leave that up to others. The basic point is: describe in some detail an active cavalry screening (say a movement up/through the Shenandoah "major" or through Maryland or from the Union point of view ) and an active large-scale scouting mission (perhaps that by Buford at the opening of Gettysburg or before Brandy Station or even that relating to a smaller engagement such as the Battle of Corinth (it seems information about the enemy was so much more lacking in the West than in the East despite the presence of cavalry)).
Again, many thanks,
--Lou
On Wednesday, December 19, 2007, at 11:39PM, "Keith Poulter"
>Louis,
>
> I will try to find space for your letter in the Crossfire column, and print as close to definitive answers as we can. For now, and just for your personal attention, here are my personal responses off the top of my head:
>
>1. There wasn't exactly a "Fort Vicksburg," but the guns of the city could pretty much rule out any Union river movement upstream, as the current was fierce and vessels could only have made slow headway against it, leaving them sitting ducks for a considerable length of time. Daylight movement by anything except an armored vessel would have been suicidal. Downstream movement would also have been hazardous (witness the transports that ran the gauntlet on 22 April, 1863 -- I hope I got that date right, no time to look it up right now. Effectively therefore, movement up and down the Mississippi was blocked -- as a regular supply route -- as long as the Confederates held Vicksburg.
>
>2. It wasn't critical, in the sense that it was not vital for Union goods/supplies/men to move up or down the river. It was, however, politically critical, for the farmers of the Mid-West wanted to be able to ship their product down the river. Economically the importance of this had declined before the war, with the linkage of the Mid-West to the East by railroad (and canal). Nevertheless, the river route still loomed large in the consciousness of those in Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, Iowa, etc.
>
>3. The Confedrates did attempt to interdict the river by placing artillery along the shore, and moving it when threatened. However, the Union riverine vessels and the use of marines and others to land and ravage localities used for such operations -- and the limited effect of such artillery -- rendered this a nuisance, but not more.
>
>4. Yes. There was considerable cross-river traffic (west to east) prior to the siege -- especially important was salt, used to cure meat for the eastern armies. It wasn't the fall of Vicksburg that halted this flow of goods, so much as the presence of the Union navy on the river. Of course, once Vicksburg (and then Port Hudson) fell, the navy presence became that much more effective.
>
>5. I don't know numbers/quantities. However, the loss of salt alone made the supply of meat to the Army of North Virginia more problematic, and this added significantly to Lee's logistical difficulties.
>
>Confederate trans-Mississippi commander Kirby Smith failed to come to the aid of those on the eastern shore, but in any case I think his contribution could not have been very significant. Also, the Union had enough troops west of the Mississippi to confront the Confederates there, so probably any long-term movement of Confederate troops across the river would have unhinged their position west of the river.
>Confederate attacks on Union positions on the western shore of the Mississippi were singularly unsuccessful, viz. Helena, Milliken's Bend.
>
>Louis, as I said, that's just off the top of my head for you. I will consult Terry Winschel, park historian at Vicksburg, to see what he can add (for publication) and how far he agrees with what I have said.
>
>best wishes,
>
>Keith
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Louis Sheehan
> To: crossfire@northandsouthmagazine.com
> Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2007 8:11 PM
> Subject: Letter to the Editor
>
>
> I wrote a quick customer review on amazon.com as below. Perhaps your magazine (yes, I subscribe) could answer these questions? --Lou Sheehan
>
>
> Struggle for Vicksburg (DVD Video)
>
>
> A workmanlike presentation of some of the very basic facts of the Siege. To my disappointment, no re-enactors were used.
>
> I?ve yet to across a source that answers these questions that follow, so I don?t want to imply my asking them suggests unique faults with this movie.
>
> To what extent could the Fort of Vicksburg inhibit Union supply river traffic upstream and downstream (i.e., completely? 30% 70?)?
>
> Realizing rivers were relatively efficient ways to transport supplies (vis-à-vis wagons and mules albeit I am not as certain as to the relative merits between the use of rivers and railroads), how critical was it to have ?unrestricted? access to the ENTIRE river? (Recall, New Orleans was in Union hands.)
>
> What would the effects have been ? and the responses to ? random/sporadic/varying placements of Rebel cannon along the long shoreline of the otherwise ?unrestricted? river?
>
> By only holding a non-besieged Vicksburg, did that allow the Rebels to effectively transfer supplies and troops across the Misssissippi from West to East?
>
> Beginning in the summer of 1863, how much material and how many troops were effectively contained in the Western Confederacy and prohibited from moving East? Assuming any, how much of a difference might they have made and how? Louis J Sheehan
>
>
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