Sunday, August 2, 2009

Kalinin, north of Moscow 3.99 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

governments enter into agreements covering the general points and leaving the details up to the private broadcasting associations.[1141]

In rejoinder on September 12, the Foreign Minister pointed to the previously established exchange radio agreement between Japan and Italy, which had been based on a sincere understanding between the radio bureaus of both countries. However, if the German authorities, as a matter of government policy, pressed for an understanding regarding this agreement, the Japanese on their part would like to request that an exchange of notes confirm the agreement. The Foreign Minister urged that Ambassador Oshima keep this in mind while once more negotiating with the German authorities.[1142]

After meeting with German officials again according to his instructions, Ambassador Oshima explained to Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 20, 1941 that Germany had decided that an agreement between the two broadcasting associations would be concluded and that the governments of the two countries concerned should have recognition to the agreement by an exchange of memoranda. With regard to clause V, which Germany had previously desired to delete anyhow, they proposed that, "those engaged in the work of broadcasting should reserve to the Government the ultimate right of censorship in matters of political importance and a clause should be included to the effect that officials engaged in exchanging broadcasts should follow instructions given by the Ambassador."

Since a great deal of time had already been spent in discussing the matter, Ambassador Oshima urged that his government compromise on the point of government negotiations and put the plan into practice immediately.[1143]

Foreign Minister Toyoda then notified Ambassador Oshima that the authorities in Tokyo had decided to conclude the agreement between the broadcasting associations of the two countries based on the Japanese proposals regarding the exchange of broadcasts between Japan and Germany and to exchange a memorandum patterned after the official Japanese-German Medical Science agreement of 1939, between the governments of the two countries in order to validify the above. Japan would agree to eliminate Clause V of the proposals.

Expressing the desire of Tokyo broadcasting authorities to have the signing of the agreement take place in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda proposed that Mr. Shichiro Komori be made Japanese director of this broadcasting association and asked that the Germans select their representative and notify Tokyo.[1144] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

468. Rumanian Losses Revealed

By October 6, 1941, reports from Bucharest transmitted salient points from a Rumanian official announcement which located the Rumanian alpine and cavalry forces with the Germans between the Dnieper River and the sea of Azov. Since the beginning of hostilities Rumanian forces reportedly had captured 60,000, killed 70,000, and wounded 100,000, while Rumanian loses were counted at 20,000 dead and 15,000 missing. This bulletin reported that the fire caused by the bombing of the Ploesti Petroleum Works had amounted to no more than 300,000,000 lei.[1145]

469. Ambassador Oshima Denies Rumors of Russo-German Pre-War Negotiations

Declaring that intelligence which had been sent to him by the Foreign Office to the effect that Germany was now reaping the mistake of turning against Russia in June, 1941 was a "ridiculous fabrication", Ambassador Oshima on October 2, 1941 gave what he believed to be

[1141] III, 864.
[1142] III, 865.
[1143] III, 866.
[1144] III, 867.
[1145] III, 868.

[235]

the true motives for Germany's entrance into the war against Russia. Since it was Germany's purpose to consolidate the eastern front for the war against England, it had been necessary to annihilate the Russian field troops and to overthrow the Communist regime. With these objectives, it was clear, according to Ambassador Oshima, that no demands had been filed with Russia nor had Germany's objectives been discussed over a conference table. It was true, the Japanese Ambassador conceded, that Russia was putting up a far more obstinate fight than Germany had imagined possible.

Furthermore, the rumors that Herr Von Ribbentrop was operating his own spy agency in Germany were false since the German Foreign Minister, helping and advising daily at Supreme Headquarter in Berlin, was in the closest confidence of Chancellor Hitler. Such rumors were branded as pure nonsense by Ambassador Oshima who stated that they had been circulated in the United States only to drive a wedge between Japan and Germany. Ambassador Oshima suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda allow competent Japanese authorities to peruse the telegrams he had written before and during the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.[1146]

470. Ambassador Oshima Counteracts British and American Propaganda

In order to counteract what Ambassador Oshima termed British and American propaganda relative to the strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East, he communicated on October 6, 1941 a list of the Russian Far Eastern divisions which had been destroyed since the middle of September. According to the German High Command, these divisions had already ceased to exist as organized divisions since the middle of August.[1147]

On October 8, Ambassador Oshima related pertinent points of a recent conversation with Germany army and naval attaches who had just returned from a tour of observation of the eastern front. From this meeting, he learned that should the German army continue at its current rate of advance disposing of the Russian troops in Moscow, and its surrounded neighborhood, it would not be long before the eastern front could be consolidated.

Commenting upon the British and United States "propaganda" regarding Germany's plan to offer peace to the Soviet immediately after the fall of Moscow, he stated that this would never happen. In explaining his opinion he remarked that although Germany would in the future direct her principal strength against England, she would not weaken her aggressive attack on the Soviet Union until the Communist regime had been overthrown.

He cautioned Tokyo against believing British and American reports that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union had been stalemated; for it was self-evident that the fall of Moscow would be a tremendous blow to the Stalin regime.[1148]

471. Ambassador Oshima Report on Russo-German Warfare, October 11, 1941

Despite Ambassador Oshima's warning to Tokyo against placing too much confidence in British-American propaganda, he could not deny that the German advance had slowed considerably. In order to explain this event, he announced on October 11, 1941 that the Soviet army had been found to possess a far greater supply of weapons than was expected and that the entire nation had been aroused to stubborn resistance. Therefore, the German army had not attempted the impossible by attacking them outright but had deliberately plotted for their annihilation by means of slow methodical warfare. He repeated that Soviet losses had been extremely heavy in comparison to German army casualties.

In this message the Ambassador also announced the beginning of the large-scale siege of Moscow and predicted that the remainder of Marshal Samyou Timoshenko's troops would suffer severe treatment at the hand of the invading German army. This devastating blow, in line

[1146] III, 869.
[1147] III, 870.
[1148] III, 871.

[236]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

with German strategy, had been dealt the Soviet forces before the severe winter had set in. Germany had seized the larger part of Soviet raw materials, so that soon the invaded country would be reduced to servitude.[1149]

Although Ambassador Oshima had from time to time expressed the belief that the extinction of Communism was the primary purpose of Germany's war aims, he now pointed out with assurance that Germany's principal objective in this war was the overthrow of Great Britain. This would have to be done by an increase of air attacks and submarine warfare followed by landing operations. Such operations, Ambassador Oshima believed, would not take place before spring. Although he acknowledged that Great Britain believed such landing operations would end in failure, he assured his Home Office that the preparations of Germany had assumed large proportions backed by the cooperation of all the war industries of Europe, and by the excellence of the German supreme command and the quality of its soldiers. He then pointed to the example set by the German army in the Norway operations and in breaking the Maginot line.

Ambassador Oshima continued stating that Germany itself was awaiting the invasion hour with the greatest of confidence. In the meantime, it planned to complete operations in the Caucasus, the Near East and Egypt. With regard to British strength in the Far East, Ambassador Oshima explained that Germany considered such claims of 750,000 British troops a great "bluff" and did not believe it necessary to move large opposing forces there. Thus, it would keep its main forces for a concentration of the landing operations in England.[1150]

He again repeated that Germany expected to bring Britain to its knees by force of arms if it did not surrender unconditionally. In this event, although the British royal family, the government and the navy would flee to overseas possessions and continue resistance with American cooperation, still the spiritual effect of successful landing operations on British soil would strike the world a resounding blow.

Should the government flee England, there would be no hope of British victory, since it was not believed that resistance could be continued without immediate leadership and 40,000,000 subjects would be left to die. The Ambassador then commented upon the fact that Germany had repeatedly made the statement that it assumed no responsibility for feeding peoples of occupied areas.

Personally, however, Ambassador Oshima did not believe in the possibility of British leaders' fleeing to overseas areas. He recognized that much would depend upon the United States' attitude in the near future, but he did not expect that America would be in a position to formally declare war on Germany early in 1942. Then, if after having subjugated Britain, Europe, Russia, North Africa and the Near East, Germany proceeded with her plans for a new order in Europe, even the United States would not be able to do anything about it.

Ambassador Oshima also considered the possibility of Germany's not being able to attack the United States even though at war with it, and submitted that he believed some way would be found for Germany and the United States to reach an agreement. In his opinion, even though the two countries should continue to oppose each other, a state of war between them would not last long.

Then Ambassador Oshima dealt briefly on the hope of Britain and United States that internal disturbances would interrupt German progress, stating that at present the occupied areas were of no concern and that Germany was not in the least worried about the situation following the conquest of England.[1151]

[1149] III, 872.
[1150] III, 873.
[1151] III, 874.

[237]

472. Ambassador Oshima Urges Support of Germany's War

Finally, Ambassador Oshima approached the point he had been attempting to emphasize. In his opinion should Germany be forced to accept merely the occupation of the British Isles, abandoning its plan for complete overthrow of the British Empire throughout the world, Japan in the future would still face the combined interests of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East. Therefore, Japan must assist in the complete conquest of the British Empire. Along this line the speedy settlement of the China incident was mandatory and Ambassador Oshima pointed to the need for the resources and markets of the south. The great objective in concluding the Tripartite Pact had been this very thing. Said Ambassador Oshima,

"The realization of our objectives, and destiny of the Empire for a thousand years now hangs upon the success of

Germany and Italy in Europe."

He again warned against being taken in by British propaganda and reiterated his belief that it would be more difficult for Japan in the future should Germany and Italy gain a victory only in Europe.[1152]

To insure the future of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Ambassador Oshima urged that Japan reinstate the true aims of the Tripartite Pact by establishing a definite course with regard to the war in Europe. As one means to this end, he reaffirmed his desire that Tokyo make plans to eliminate the Soviet threat at this opportune time. Then simultaneously with Germany's invasion of England in the spring of 1942, the government should launch its southward penetration. He asked that the German high command be kept informed of Japan's efforts along these lines.[1153]

473. Promiscuous Dissemination of Restricted News is Condemned by Foreign Minister Toyoda

With the continuation of damaging British and Russian propaganda, it soon developed that Ambassador Oshima was not the only one concerned about general dissemination of restricted news in Japan; for on October 11, Foreign Minister Toyoda issued a reprimand to Berlin in which he suggested that since popular dissemination of short-wave wireless news of a certain classification was not permitted in Japan, any privilege accorded to foreign diplomatic establishments should not be abused by allowing promiscuous publication. Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that the policy in Japan had been to restrict all material which was used in publication "Bulletin" to the general public, but to allow it some distribution among foreign officials. In view of the current situation it would also be quite impossible to allow Germany or Italy popular use of the releases.

The Foreign Minister explained that the Vice Minister had already approached Ambassador Ott on the proposition of strengthening cooperation between Axis and Domei reporters, at the same time arranging for an interview between Ambassador Ott and Chief of the Intelligence Bureau Ito, on the 10th of October. At this meeting, it was decided that publication of all pamphlets other than the "Bulletin" would be suppressed. The exhibition of all British propaganda films were to be ruled out and the publication and exhibition of German and Italian films in Japan would be increased.[1154]

474. Government Control of Press Urged by Ambassador Oshima

On October 13, 1941 Ambassador Oshima took his turn in rebuking the home government for releasing an editorial by the Domei press to the effect that Germany should end Russo-German hostilities and concentrate on an invasion of England insomuch as a long war would be disadvantageous to the Axis countries. He also took this opportunity to rebuke the Foreign

[1152] III, 875.
[1153] III, 876.
[1154] III, 877.

[238]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Office for the release of the Domei dispatch from Ankara revealing that Hungary had lost forty per cent of her total army in the current Soviet campaign. Then releases, Ambassador Oshima pointed out, had been used by Boston and other foreign broadcasting stations in propaganda activities, and, besides, they served to arouse the displeasure of the Axis powers. He demanded that strict representations to the proper authorities be made so that future reports and editorials of this type would be completely Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire eliminated.[1155]

475. Germany and Turkey Sign Commercial Pact

On October 9, 1941 Japanese-Ankara spokesmen revealed that the commercial treaty which had been under negotiation between Germany and Turkey had been signed, effective for one and one half years. The total amount of exports and imports were set at 200,000,000 marks each, with Germany trading manufactured goods for Turkey's raw materials. Although this figure was computed on a basis of 50 per cent of Turkey's output, Germany planned to take over the complete 1943 supply of chrome to bring the total Turkish exports to Germany up the scale.[1156]

476. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop

Foreign Minister Joachim Von Ribbentrop made the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact[1157] on October 1, 1941 an occasion for expression Germany's dissatisfaction with the Japanese negotiations with the United States. During several visits with him Ambassador Oshima learned that Germany was thoroughly disgusted with Japan, having received proof that although Japan would not confide the secret Japanese-United States negotiations with its Tripartite partner, America was continually revealing Japanese-American secrets to the British. Ambassador Oshima explained that he was attempting to convince the press that German high officials were also informed of the negotiations, but the whole hoax was proving increasingly difficult.

Ambassador Oshima was ever conscious of third power impressions which seemed now to picture Japan as avoiding the conflict because of impoverishment resulting from the China incident, and because she lacked faith in the outcome of the European war.

Now, even though Germany might overlook inevitable attempts of third powers to divide the Axis partners and would keep up a pretense of smooth relations, still there was a general bad feeling among leaders which might precipitate malicious acts on the part of Germany.[1158]

477. Germany Disapproves of Japan's Attitude Toward Russian-American Trade

Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop the following day called to the attention of Ambassador Oshima the receipt of a report revealing that Japan had approved the sailing of American ships through to Vladivostok.[1159]

In answer to Ambassador Oshima's demand that he be told the true situation, Tokyo divulged that Japan had stood firmly against Russian-American trade on the basis of the current political situation. America, when questioned by Japan, had replied that it felt that such trade was a political matter between America and Russia and should cause Japan no uneasiness. To Japan's charge that this was an unfriendly act, America had invoked the freedom of the seas doctrine and had said that it could not tolerate interference with its foreign trade.

Tokyo then explained that five United States tankers carrying between 60,000 and 95,000 barrels of oil each, had entered Vladivostok from the middle of August until October 9th. In

[1155] III, 878.
[1156] III, 879.
[1157] III, 880.
[1158] III, 881.
[1159] III, 882.

[239]

addition, the number of Russian ships which had operated between American and the Soviet Union was nine, with an estimated total of 300,000 barrels of oil and aeroplane parts transported.[1160]

Conductor Hidemuro Konoye, younger brother of the Premier, who had been on tour in Europe at the outbreak of hostilities, joined Ambassador Oshima in an appeal to Prince Fuminaro Konoye for an elimination of existing Axis ill-will resulting from American shipping to Vladivostok and the American-Japanese negotiations.

Hidemaro Konoye explained that as long as the Tripartite Pact was still in active existence, Germany would be much perturbed at Japanese philandering with the Americans and would object strenuously to announcements by the Tokyo Information Bureau that intimate progress was being made in Russian-American negotiations. Mr. Konoye suggested that Tokyo explain to Germany that any negotiations with the United States that were not in harmony with the spirit of the Tripartite Treaty would be merely a political scheme and that actually there would be no change in Japan's policy.[1161]

478. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Pro-American Statements

Meanwhile Diet Member Juiji Kasai in the United States had been making anti-German, pro-American statements;[1162] but Ambassador Oshima was assured by Tokyo that Kasai had been warned vigorously and that close tab was being kept on him.[1163] However, by October 13 Ambassador Oshima, still convinced that Kasai would not reform, requested that Foreign Minister Toyoda return the offender to Japan.

The Ambassador also reported on American broadcasts which contended that Foreign Minister Matusoka had entered into the undesirable Tripartite Pact without the majority consent of the people; and that if the United States and Germany went to war, Germany would be to blame.[1164]

Foreign Minister Toyoda in a reply on October 14, 1941 admitted that he feared that British and United States attempts to separate Japan and Germany would precipitate a difficult situation where he himself was concerned, and he requested that Ambassador Oshima explain Japan's good intentions regarding the Tripartite Pact.[1165]

479. Japanese-German Trade Difficulties Recur

Recurrences of trade difficulties between Germany and Japan continued to cause Ambassador Oshima much concern in view of the insufficient funds available in the exchange allotment for Japanese government purchases. Up until October 13, 1941 there had been no difficulties making payment for government orders out of the fixed allotment; but since then civilian purchases had become so large that even the government was being forced to forego placing new orders. Ambassador Oshima suggested, in order to alleviate the situation, that Germany be requested to make credit available for Japan's use.[1166]

On October 16, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda revealed that Japan's payment to Germany which had to be made by March 1943, exceeded 80,000,000 yen or 14,810,000 marks, according to German authorities. Although it was expected that by cancellations of contracts due to the war this figure would be considerably lessened, still the problem of meeting the debt was imminent. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion, however, that the German government would

[1160] III, 883.
[1161] III, 884.
[1162] III, 885.
[1163] III, 886.
[1164] III, 887.
[1165] III, 888.
[1166] III, 889.

[240]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

agree to purchasing goods from Japan in that amount and negotiations for a provisional agreement to cover the purchases and payment of both sides were under way. The goods with which Japan bargained to supply Germany and which were to be applied on the deficit included whale oil, raw silk, and cotton thread.[1167]

480. German Manufacturers Aid Japan's War Industries

That Japan looked to Germany for assistance in developing manufacturing techniques was shown in a series of commercial messages sent through diplomatic channels from August 8 to October 10, 1941. The necessity of Japan's producing its own steel castings caused the navy to decide to have a civilian company in Japan study the matter or to send Japanese technicians to Germany for factory training, depending upon the relative costs.[1168]

An explanation by the Junkers Company of Germany enabled the Japanese by August 8 to complete their investigation of the SV-11 type propeller.[1169] However, as late as October 6 negotiations regarding the propeller-purchase by the Hamamatsu Musical Instrument Company remained unsettled. The transfer of the manufacturing rights had been forced upon the Junkers Company by the Japanese, and the Germans insisted upon a higher price.[1170]

Meanwhile the Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Company had purchased patent rights for the Askania-manufactured automatic pilot. Despite the recognized urgency in learning the techniques, the War Office of the Senior Adjutant in Tokyo wired Berlin on August 30 that it was impossible to send personnel from Japan at that time; however, at least one technician from the Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Company and Engineer Yoshinari would join the Askania laboratory.[1171] By October 6, 1941 discussions concerning the automatic pilot compasses and the Siemens electric gauges had not been completed because of exchange currency and transportation difficulties. In regard to the automatic pilot Berlin informed the Japanese government that this apparatus was not then being manufactured and thus purchases had become impossible.[1172]

The Japanese Vice Minister of War on August 29 requested that Dr. Helmut Wohlthat, German commercial attache in Tokyo, assist Japan in acquiring the "IG" patent rights from Germany. He wired the Japanese delegation in Berlin on September 5 Dr. Wohlthat's reply, that although Germany was in accord in regard to the "IG" transfer, there remained the fact that, just as Japan felt about America, Germany did not wish to goad that country at the moment.[1173]

Market disturbances were created in Bangkok during September because of German buying of rubber and tin. A German agent, Schmidt, had employed 100,000 bahts, sent from Shanghai via the Yokohama Specie Bank to camouflaged Chinese companies, to make these purchases.[1174]

Definite arrangements for paying for special universal drills from the Swiss Rumer Company through Germany were requested by Berlin authorities in a dispatch to the Japanese Vice Minister of War on September 13, 1941.[1175] Other Swiss manufacturing equipment was contracted by Japan through these channels.[1176]

[1167] III, 890.
[1168] III, 891.
[1169] III, 892.
[1170] III, 893.
[1171] III, 894.
[1172] III, 895.
[1173] III, 896-897.
[1174] III, 898.
[1175] III, 899.
[1176] III, 900-901.

[241]

481. Ambassador Oshima Reports on German War Plans, October 16, 1941

On October 16, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported that German army plans called for leaving a small observation force at Leningrad while part of the Reebuk forces advanced toward the encirclement of Moscow. Ambassador Oshima stated that nothing but annihilation faced the Russian forces in Leningrad. Meanwhile the mechanized forces having already reached Kalinin, north of Moscow, had proceeded as far as Yaroslav, approximately 250 kilometers northwest of Moscow, where the ground was already frozen thereby facilitating troop movements.

Ambassador Oshima also pointed out how ignorant the Russian army was of the true war situation in that, unaware that Germans had taken Kalinin the week before, they proceeded to transport troops for 48 hours after the city had fallen. This blunder resulted in Germany's taking many prisoners.

To the south of Moscow, infantry regiments had already arrived in Tula and mechanized troops were extending in an encircling wing eastward of Moscow. However, thawing snow and complicated forests and swamps were naturally slowing the advance of the German forces. With regard to the Karkov area, Ambassador Oshima revealed that little resistance was being met from Russian forces.[1177]

[1177] III, 902.